Blocking the Future: New Solutions for Old Problems in Historical Social Science by Bearman, Peter Shawn et al.
  
Blocking the Future: New Solutions for Old Problems in Historical Social Science
Author(s): Peter Bearman, Robert Faris and  James Moody
Source: Social Science History, Vol. 23, No. 4, Special Issue: What Is Social Science History?
(Winter, 1999), pp. 501-533
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1171636
Accessed: 22-03-2019 19:34 UTC
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Social Science History
This content downloaded from 209.2.208.15 on Fri, 22 Mar 2019 19:34:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Peter Bearman, Robert Faris, and James Moody
 Blocking the Future
 New Solutions for Old Problems in Historical Social Science
 The only true voyage would be not to travel through a hundred different
 lands with the same pair of eyes, but to see the same land with a hundred
 different pairs of eyes.
 Marcel Proust
 Although it may turn out to be otherwise, this is an early article in what is
 hoped to be a larger series of studies in the application of network meth-
 ods to historical problems. This article explores some new solutions to old
 problems in historical social science and history more generally and provides
 some templates for thinking about an old problem in a new light. The old
 problem is the problem that arises when one considers how we know what
 historical events mean and how we can have confidence in our interpreta-
 Social Science History 23:4 (winter 1999).
 Copyright ? 1999 by the Social Science History Association.
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 tions. For many social science historians, the problem of meaning is sec-
 ondary to the problem of making causal arguments. And often the practical
 reality of much historical work is that more mundane problems of data and
 evidence often consume an unusual amount of time and energy, drawing at-
 tention away from the luxurious concerns discussed in this article - concerns
 with what things actually mean. Despite the recognition that the problem of
 meaning may not lurk around every corner for all social science historians,
 the goal of this article is to propose some new strategies for determining what
 things mean in historical context.
 The argument we make is simple. The meaning of an event is condi-
 tional on its position in a sequence of interrelated events, what we conven-
 tionally call a case. Consequently, for those who are interested in what events
 mean, the problem of casing event sequences is one of the most fundamental
 problems that confront historians and historical sociologists. Casing is a pre-
 requisite for meaning: only when we can provide a beginning and an end to
 a sequence of interrelated events can we understand the meaning of an event
 within the sequence and, by extension, the meaning of an event sequence as
 a whole. Developing this part of the argument is the focus of the first section.
 Identifying "casing" as one of the problems to be solved is the first and
 easiest step. The next step is to propose a solution. Our solution exploits de-
 velopments in social network analysis that are relevant for the analysis of
 complex event structures. Historical sociologists and others before us (Bear-
 man 1993; Gould 1995, 1996; Padgett and Ansell 1993; Rosenthal et al. 1987;
 Barkey and Van Rossen 1997; Brudner and White 1997; White et al. 1999)
 have made significant substantive contributions to our understanding of par-
 ticular historical problems through the application of network models for
 populations of (among other things) persons, institutions, lineages, and other
 elements linked through flows of (among other things) resources, patron-
 age, joint commitment, and kinship. In the second section, we briefly discuss
 these contributions. We then focus on the similarities between social struc-
 tures and event structures. These similarities point to the applicability of
 network methods for the analysis of historical data. These similarities also
 suggest that historical processes may be more robust to perturbation than
 many social science historians think. Finally, we discuss the implications of
 redundancy in event structures for models of historical change that rely on
 chance and contingency.
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 Casing, bounding the beginning and end of event sequences, is not dis-
 similar from an old problem in structural analysis: how to specify a boundary
 on a network (e.g., a population of nodes connected by flows). The prob-
 lem for historical social science involves generating a population of events.
 Strategies for generating a population of events in historical contexts are
 briefly described in the third section, where we also describe and use data
 that are convenient for illustrating the core methodology: life stories. We ex-
 ploit modeling techniques for narrative networks described earlier in Bear-
 man and Stovel's article (forthcoming) and suggested by Roberto Franzosi
 (1999) to transform life stories into networks.
 In the fourth section, we describe the general historical context and illus-
 trate our method (without technical detail) with respect to a single complex
 case: revolution, counterrevolution, and revolution in a Chinese village be-
 tween 1920 and 1950. Operations on the network of events induced from the
 intercalation of multiple stories provide the foundation for our analyses, in
 which we "test" our casing solution by simulating the future. Robust cases
 are those that are insensitive to minor perturbation. This suggests that his-
 tory is far less conditional than is often thought, an idea we return to later
 in the article. In some ways, we implicitly propose a new method for doing
 historical social science (and history more generally). We explore these im-
 plications further in the discussion section.
 The Problem of Casing
 In many respects, the problem of casing historical event sequences is the
 most fundamental problem confronting historians and historical sociologists.
 Casing is necessarily implicated in the simple task of constructing a histori-
 cal narrative. Likewise, casing is a prerequisite for meaning, for only when
 we can provide a beginning and an end to a sequence of interrelated events
 can we understand the meaning of an event within the sequence and, by ex-
 tension, the meaning of an event sequence as a whole. That narrative and
 meaning are the product of casing is hardly a new idea for historians. For
 social scientists, this insight has come harder.'
 The importance of casing for history tells us that we should not be too
 surprised that historians don't feel the need to write a "joy of casing" cook-
 book. Something as fundamental to a whole discipline could hardly be purely
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 menu-driven, as accessible to the pure novice as to those initiated through
 the arduous practice of disciplinary initiation we now label graduate school.
 Since casing is what historians and historical social scientists do, and since
 the adequacy of their interpretations depends on casing, casing is necessarily
 seen as a matter of insight and the judgment that arises from such insight.2
 Explicit acknowledgment of the idea that casing is a matter of judgment is
 routine. Consider in this light the following passage:
 Once again, deciding how to bound an event is necessarily a matter of
 judgement. One may state as a rule of thumb that how an analyst should
 delimit an event will depend on the structural transformation to be ex-
 plained .... Such decisions must be made post hoc: with some confi-
 dence when dealing with an event that occurred two-hundred years ago
 and whose consequences have generally been fixed for some time, more
 tentatively when the consequences of a rupture have only recently begun
 to appear and when additional, perhaps surprising, consequences may
 yet emerge. (Sewell 1996: 877-88)
 Our first goal in this article is to propose a method for casing historical
 events. But what initially seems simple turns out to be especially compli-
 cated. One complication comes from the future. Because the meaning of an
 event is conditional on its position in a sequence of interrelated events,3 it is
 necessarily impossible to fix forever the meaning of an event-that is, to fix
 forever the end and beginning of a sequence of events. To do this, we would
 have to stop history, because future events can activate, or draw into a new
 event sequence, past events. Therefore, it is always the case that the future
 could condition the meaning of the past. Many examples of this process come
 to mind. To select one example, the AIM takeover at Wounded Knee in 1973
 activated the previously minor event the Battle of Wounded Knee,4 thereby
 bringing the initial event into a new "end," and consequently changed its
 meaning. In this sense, casing historical events and event sequences neces-
 sarily involves (temporarily) blocking the future.
 The future finds expression in the past in more mundane ways as well.
 The meaning of an event is also changeable by virtue of a by-product of the
 historians' craft -discovery. Historians may discover new events, new rela-
 tions between previously known events, or new relations between previously
 known and previously unknown events. Such discoveries have the capacity
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 to change beginnings and ends and, therefore, the specific meaning of events.
 It may also be that one day in the future we could discover signs in the past
 that all events and event sequences are not as we now imagine. Paranoiacs
 and conspiracy theorists, of course, think they have already discovered such
 signs.
 The fact that it is possible for the meaning of events or event sequences
 to change does not mean that we should abandon the attempt to develop a
 strategy for casing event sequences. First, while discovery or the future may
 activate some events, most events are never so fortunate. Only the lucky cat
 has nine lives. Whatever meaning most events have is likely fixed completely
 within a single, specific event sequence itself fixed within larger, more com-
 plex event sequences. Put another way, neither the discovery of new events
 nor unknown future occurrences are likely to alter in any way the sequence
 of events that "dead" events are embedded in; consequently, their meaning
 is also fixed.5
 Still, some events have already, and some more may, become embedded
 in new event sequences following discovery or the occurrence of events in
 their future. Thus, we can imagine a distribution of events defined with re-
 spect to their probability of activation, "fluidity of meaning," or suscepti-
 bility to being conditioned by the future. If we can array events with respect
 to their probability of being conditioned by the future, it follows that event
 sequences are also characterized by such a distribution. Consequently, con-
 geries of densely interrelated event sequences (what we will ultimately define
 as a case) are also subject to the same distribution, though some are more
 likely to change than others.
 This makes intuitive sense and is confirmed by the judgment that histo-
 rians use. Recall the loose criteria proposed by William Sewell: Confidence
 comes with time. Some cases are more robust to the future than others. The
 Bronze Age as a case is probably pretty robust. So are most others. It is hard
 to imagine--now -what realistic future event could meaningfully activate
 the sequence of events composing, for example, the Christianizing of the
 West.6 The case seems dead enough. In contrast, it is not hard to imagine-
 now--what future event could meaningfully activate (or has meaningfully
 activated) the sequence of events composing the impeachment of Andrew
 Johnson. We cannot affix (forever) a single meaning to events embedded
 within sequences, or event sequences embedded in populations of other event
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 sequences. We can nonetheless try to assess what kinds of events, event se-
 quences, and sets of interrelated event sequences are likely to be conditioned
 by future events. In simple terms, some events, event sequences, and cases
 are dead. Some events and event sequences are subject to radical revision. We
 can confidently talk about the meaning of dead events. Our confidence falls
 with those events likely to be hot potatoes. The practical problem is knowing
 which events, event sequences, and cases are hot potatoes and which are not.
 Sewell solves the problem of casing by definition, ultimately relying on
 analysts' judgment: easy for history long past, less so for more recent his-
 tory. Sewell has the right instinct. The problem of casing rests on controlling
 the future, for future events may transform the meanings of past events in
 unanticipated ways. Control over the future is easier when it is long in the
 past. Casing is not so problematic for events that happened long ago, so pre-
 sumably one can know what things mean just by waiting history out.7 We are
 not so patient. There is more at stake than our patience. Interesting analytic
 problems appear once the problem of finding ends and beginnings to event
 sequences becomes a central focus. What kind of events are case breakers,
 that is, events whose activation by the future transforms the cases in which
 they are embedded? What proportion of events are case breakers? Is case
 breaking a structural feature of an event (e.g., the product of position in a
 sequence of events), or a feature of the content of events? If the latter, are spe-
 cific contents more or less likely to occupy different positions? We propose
 answers to these questions which, given our current method and strategy for
 representing historical event sequences, are inaccessible to us.
 Strong Theory and Thin History
 The stronger the theory, the thinner the history--a truism that is revealed
 most clearly when one sets out to represent history as a network of events
 connected by flows of causation. Historical accounts of events, especially
 those proffered by social science historians, tend to have a uniform appear-
 ance. They start with a relatively dense cluster of interrelated events. These
 typically macrolevel events (fiscal crisis, agrarian crisis, crisis in confidence/
 legitimacy, for example) flow into a narrow stream of specific microlevel
 events. Multiple pathways pour into a single thin line of interconnected
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 Figure 1 Sewell's (1996) account of the collapse of the ancien regime
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 events. A thin pathway (sparsely connected, with very little redundancy, few
 cycles, etc.) moves through time, ultimately inducing a pivotal event that is
 characterized by high out-degree, impacting multiple event sequences and
 providing (typically) the boundary of the "case."
 Sewell's (1996) article on the collapse of the ancien regime provides a
 useful example. It is a careful and subtle article, suggesting a more complex
 vision than the more standard literature. For our purposes it can be con-
 sidered a gold standard article, because it won a prize. Figure 1 provides a
 graphic representation of the structure of Sewell's account. Nodes are spe-
 cific events mentioned in his article; edges are links between events (causal
 or logical) implicit or explicit in his account. Time moves in general from
 left to right. The storming of the Bastille is event #60. It is a rich account
 but still exhibits the general structure of social science history accounts. The
 image is of historical process as a sand clock, with thick causal richness at
 the start, often thought of as a conjuncture of specific path-dependent event
 sequences (here, the confluence of fiscal crisis, agrarian crisis, and a crisis
 of legitimacy); thin narrative pathways in the middle (the neck); and dif-
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 fuse broad outcomes at the boundary of the case. The bottleneck regions are
 where causal dynamics are observed; hence, they appear especially subject to
 butterfly effects.
 Theory involves denying data. Thin narrative accounts are the product
 of specific theories that direct the historian to identify some events as salient
 and to deny other events as not salient. History involves selection of events
 to interconnect into a narrative.8 To have a theory requires that we know the
 end of the story so that we can direct the selection of events. This is the prob-
 lem. How are we to know the beginning and end if they alone tell us what
 the events mean?
 Rather than focus directly on the selection of events, all we want to
 do now is consider the implicit theory of history as characterized by thin
 lines without independent pathways connecting causes and events. An irony
 is that with strong theory we are soon driven to contemplation of butter-
 fly effects as driving history, or worse, history of the "for want of a horse"
 variety. No doubt, contingency plays a role in history, but it cannot play an
 overwhelming role. We need to develop a method for doing history that si-
 multaneously reveals event structures that restrict the possibilities of butter-
 fly effects and identifies which events and relations between events are sub-
 ject to such effects. At least, this is our goal.
 In the Sewell narrative, there are many critical points through which
 only one path flows. Butterfly effects would be pronounced if a small per-
 turbation had the consequence of deleting (or adding) a node or line between
 events. If the event or link were absent, could we really imagine that the an-
 cien regime would not fall? The problem is not parsimony of explanation
 per se. The problem is too few sets of eyes. Many parsimonious accounts
 traversing the same field from different end points can generate a population
 with a dense event structure.
 Social Networks and Historical Social Science
 Over the past decade, a series of influential articles and studies on substan-
 tively important historical topics--from the organization of the Medici to
 Ottoman state building and beyond to the Paris Commune- have been pub-
 lished (Padgett and Ansell 1993; Gould 1995; Barkey and Van Rossen 1997).
 Network imagery and methods provide insight into specific mechanisms and
This content downloaded from 209.2.208.15 on Fri, 22 Mar 2019 19:34:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Blocking the Future 509
 processes by focusing on the middle range, above isolated individuals yet
 below whole social formations. These studies have provided new ways to
 operationalize identity (versus interest) as a foundation for understanding
 action (see also Bearman and Stovel forthcoming); they have provided new
 insight into the role that social relations play in structuring, and blocking,
 action, and more abstractly, they have provided a new language for describ-
 ing the dense, interrelated, often knotted and cyclical levels of social rela-
 tions, symbolic constructions, and practices (seen as flows in a network) that
 compose tangible social structures in historical and contemporary settings.
 These notable achievements have not come without costs. The detailed
 reconstruction of social structure, defined with respect to pattern across mul-
 tiple relations, necessary for network analysis has often led to a heightened
 commitment to highly particular explanations and a reluctance to abstract
 structure per se away from specific contexts. Consequently, much of the work
 in historical social science that uses networks looks prosopographical - an
 approach to relational data that is limited because it is unable to provide an
 analytic scaffolding for meaningful comparison across cases with respect to
 interpretable structural parameters. On the other hand, the emphasis on con-
 text has been a useful palliative to counter a more disturbing trend in social
 science history: the idea that rational choice models can serve an explana-
 tory, as opposed to heuristic, function. It is ironic that a method (structural
 network analysis) designed for comparison across contexts celebrates par-
 ticularity as the principal barrier to a theory that denies the salience of all
 contexts (despite protestation to the contrary).9
 Equally ironic is the strange marriage between relational and contin-
 gency theorists. Like many odd marriages, this one seems to be based on
 insufficient experience. As with networks, contingency has been an impor-
 tant "discovery" for historical social scientists and currently serves as the
 principal challenge to older models in historical social science that focus on
 the macrolevel determinants of social change without sufficient attention to
 (social, relational, symbolic, etc.) mechanisms.10 For the inexperienced, net-
 works provide a useful imagery for representing contingency. The principal
 metaphors are drawn from the fact that social network observations, like his-
 torical observations, are tied and interdependent. In social networks and in
 history there is the sense that the fact of interdependence means that subtle
 change can concatenate wildly through a system and cumulate into unantici-
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 pated historical and/or structural change (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). It
 is an attractive idea: social structures as sensitive to butterfly effects. But it is
 likely wrong. Tangible social structures build on and depend on local fluidity
 and disruption for stability (White 1992; Tilly 1999).11
 Robust structures absorb fluidity at the microlevel by virtue of specific
 structural features that "exploit" interdependence. Network data on a popu-
 lation are locally dense, yet globally sparse, often cyclic, knotted, and char-
 acterized by a redundancy of ties.12 Social structures share these features
 with historical structures. Most historians would agree that historical data
 are locally dense and knotted. Aside from radical revisionists, most histori-
 ans would also agree that historical data exhibit tie redundancy, the idea that
 there are multiple independent pathways through which causal effects flow.
 Cycles in historical data appear when future events condition past events,
 drawing out of the past new relations to other events.
 In social networks, local density, knottiness, redundancy, and cyclicity
 give rise to the complex social structures that organize the relational world.
 While analytically separable, they entail each other. Cyclicity gives rise to
 redundancy, redundancy gives rise to local density, and density gives rise to
 knots, generating macrolevel cohesive properties from a host of independent
 microprocesses. Our interest here is to show that event structures behave the
 same way. We demonstrate that actual event structures arising from histori-
 cal data have a similar structure, one in which order appears at the aggregate
 level, a product of microlevel fluidity. Consequently, representations of event
 structures as thin narratives, and consequently subject to butterfly effects,
 are largely mistaken.13
 Generating a Population of Events
 from Intercalating Narratives
 In order to make headway, the first step is to generate data structures that
 work. The real problem in conventional historical accounts is that the end
 determines the beginning and hence the elements to be arrayed in the narra-
 tive. Different ends tell different stories. To case an event, which may be in
 multiple interrelated sub-sequences, we need a population of events around
 which we can draw a beginning and an end and hence arrive at meaning.
 The most immediate need is to find data structures that allow us to build a
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 population of events. Two distinct strategies are possible: short-path snow-
 ball sampling and intercalating narratives. The principal idea of short-path
 snowball sampling is to start with a large sample of events and use snowball
 sampling techniques to generate a population of events. A variety of sam-
 pling strategies for networks (see Granovetter 1977 and Frank 1978 for first
 steps) can be deployed to build populations of historical events.14
 In this article we illustrate the second strategy, intercalating narratives,
 to demonstrate our method for casing. The data we use are life stories. Like
 historical accounts, life stories presume an end (a standpoint). Telling stories
 involves arraying elements selected from a rich and inexhaustible plate of
 cultural goods--people, places, things, events, ideas, and so on--into narra-
 tive sequences that are oriented toward a particular end in such a way as to
 be a plot. The end allows the author to select from an endless sea of events
 just those events he or she sees as important (on the basis of a theory) for
 the story to be revealed." But life stories, in contrast to formal histories, have
 features that make them ideal for our illustrative goal, the most important of
 which is a weak theoretical structure.
 In this article we use 14 life stories from Chinese villagers whose experi-
 ences encompassed agrarian revolt in the countryside, counterrevolution, a
 revolution, and then the encoding of a revolutionary regime into an insti-
 tutional framework. The context is a small village in northern China, and
 the story is about massive structural (and individual) change. The stories are
 taken from Report from a Chinese Village (Myrdal 1965). The book contains a
 collection of life stories of the villagers of Liu Ling village, in northern China
 near Yenan. Jan Myrdal conducted interviews there in 1961. Liu Ling village
 is no different from the other small villages in China, with one exception: it
 was involved in the Communist revolution at an early date. The stories in the
 book tell of that revolution and of what happened since then.16
 Figure 2 provides a graph representation of two of the life stories we
 use. By treating events as nodes and relations between events as arcs, we
 transform narrative sequences of elements into networks. By representing
 complex event sequences as networks, we are able to observe and measure
 structural features of narratives that might otherwise be difficult to see.
 In these graphs, elements of the narrative life story are treated as nodes
 connected by narrative clauses, represented by arcs. A narrative clause is a
 clause that is temporally ordered in such a way that moving it involves chang-
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 Figure 2 Narrative networks
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 ing the meaning of the sub-sequence in which it is embedded. Free clauses,
 by contrast, can be moved without changing the meaning of a sub-sequence
 or the narrative as a whole. Stories contain both free and narrative clauses
 (Labov 1972; Bearman and Stovel forthcoming; Franzosi 1999). We code only
 narrative clauses as arcs, linking one event (or element) to another over time.
 The elements (nodes) of the narratives are heterogeneous in scope and range,
 ranging from greeting conquering troops with tea, to a staged battle between
 the Koumintang (KMT) and the Communists.17 The former event tied the
 landowners' sons to the KMT; the latter resulted in an imaginary defeat of
 the Communists. The idea behind this mirage was to trick the KMT leader-
 ship into thinking the Communists had been crushed by local KMT forces
 so that both forces could resist the Japanese.
 In Figure 2, narrative time moves from the top of the page to the bot-
 tom. The left-right axis is not substantively interpretable. Narrative depth
 is represented by the number of arcs connecting events. In this instance, for
 example, the two events at the bottom of panel B have a narrative depth
 of 17--that is, there are 17 steps from the bottom to a starting event at the
 top of the graph. An obvious characteristic of these stories is that they are
 structurally very different from the stories of professional historians. They
 have many disconnected elements. Events are mentioned but are not nec-
 essarily tied. Across sub-sequences, it is impossible to walk from the early
 events to later events without a break. This is never the case with a profes-
 sional historical narrative. Not surprisingly, life stories are denser and more
 complex than conventional historical narratives. They tend to have deep nar-
 rative flow. They are more complex because ordinary people are not trained
 as theorists. Therefore, they have trouble denying data. They have deep nar-
 rative flow because ordinary people often organize stories around fate, which
 pulls the present into the distant past.18
 Like people, the life stories we work with exhibit a lot of heterogeneity.
 Some accounts are thin (panel A), whereas others are thick and convoluted
 (panel B). Each of these stories has a different end point. The narrators are
 standing in different places. The end of the stories involve different out-
 comes. The narrators are also standing in different positions in the village
 with respect to position and kinship relations. Figure 3 reports the kinship
 relations among the 239 residents of Liu Ling, a village composed of a domi-
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 Figure 3 Kinship relations in Liu Ling
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 nant lineage (with 84 interrelated individuals), a number of small households,
 married couples, and single individuals.
 The fact that they are standing in different places directs the selection of
 the elements that they choose to account for their end. By analogy, one might
 consider a set of professional accounts of the same sequence of events, each
 standing in a different position.19 All of the stories cover the same village and
 village events over the same time, and consequently, the field they traverse,
 and the events they refer to, overlap considerably. We exploit this overlap by
 intercalating stories to generate a population of interrelated events, which
 provides a new data structure and consequently points to new strategies for
 analysis. These new directions are taken up in the following section.
 Making and Testing a Case
 Between 1920 and 1950, China was transformed. Reform, revolution, and
 warfare wracked the countryside. No lives were untouched, and a whole
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 Figure 4 A brief history of a tidal pool
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 social structure was unearthed. Our data arise from one of thousands of vil-
 lages in northern China. They are about events in this village and their con-
 nection to distant events occurring in other villages and cities and countries,
 the character and context of which were likely unimaginable to the villagers
 who lived in Liu Ling, which has the flavor of a small tidal pool at the edge of
 a great sea (of events). The general story of Liu Ling during this period, "A
 Brief History of a Tidal Pool," is easy enough to recount, and certainly this
 is what historians often do - take multiple viewpoints to relate the basic pic-
 ture. We report this history in a traditional manner and graphically represent
 a reduced form of it as a network in Figure 4.20
 A Brief History of a Tidal Pool: Liu Ling
 during the Revolution and Beyond
 The Chinese Communist Revolution began early in the northern provinces.
 Liu Ling was among the first villages to fall under the spell of Communist
 propaganda. For as long as the oldest villager can remember, life had been
 hard under the universally cruel landowners. Liu Ling village was no ex-
 ception. During the famine of 1928, one of the landowners there, Li Yu-tse,
 stockpiled hordes of grain while his tenants ate grass. Throughout the 1930s,
 subversive Communist agents disguised as donkey drivers and peddlers care-
 fully targeted the poorest but most respected peasants. The cruelty of the
 local landlords gave the propagandists ample opportunities, and small-scale
 guerrilla activity began in the Yenan region of China during this period. Over
 time, the guerrillas were increasingly successful. Landowners began to with-
 draw into fortifications in the hills and refused to venture into their own vil-
 lages at night. The Communist Eighth Route Army supported the guerrilla
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 effort, supplying arms and ammunition. Over time, the Communists became
 bolder and seized the holdings of several landowners, forcing them to flee to
 Yenan.
 In April 1935, the guerrilla activity came to a head with the Communist
 blockade of Yenan. The siege created shortages of food and fuel inside the
 city. Soon afterward, land reforms were initiated in the surrounding country-
 side. There were, of course, periodic setbacks, as the KMT forces would raid
 villages near the city. Sometimes these raids were the occasion for pitched
 battles with the Communists, who were often victorious due to the poor
 morale of the KMT troops. Finally, in the autumn of 1936, the siege of Yenan
 and developments on the eastern front forced the KMT to withdraw from
 the city. The Eighth Route Army marched into Yenan, red flags flying.
 The fledgling Communist enterprises in the countryside that were ini-
 tiated during the blockade, such as citizen militias and agricultural coopera-
 tives, now flourished. Thus began a fruitful Communist spring. It was not
 until a decade later that war returned to the Yenan area. In 1947, Mao Tse-
 tung, anticipating the return of the KMT, sent a message to Yenan. His
 words were repeated to a crowd in the city: "Keep Yenan, lose Yenan, give
 up Yenan, win Yenan." This caused some understandable confusion among
 the people. In the end the Communist leadership convinced the citizens of
 Yenan that the Communist withdrawal would be only temporary. Confusion
 and disbelief turned into complacency, and preparations for a KMT occu-
 pation (burying corn, hiding livestock, etc.) were initiated only days before
 the arrival of General Hu Tsung-nan's forces. When the Communists com-
 pleted their withdrawal and the KMT marched into Yenan, one of General
 Hu Tsung-nan's units swept through Liu Ling.
 These troops were greeted with boiling water for tea by two sons of land-
 owners but were met with suspicion by the rest of the village. On this day
 began a long year and a half of pillage and plunder. The landowners' sons
 were immediately taken prisoner but later became intelligence operatives.
 Caves were destroyed, crops burnt, women raped, and all food confiscated.
 Many men left for the hills to re-form guerrilla bands, which quickly began
 harassing much larger KMT units. When victorious, the Communists were
 careful with POWs, who received better treatment in the Communists' cus-
 tody than at the hands of their own officers, resulting in widespread desertion
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 among the KMT. Eventually, defeats by the Communists and circumstances
 elsewhere in the country forced General Hu Tsung-nan to withdraw from
 Yenan in 1948. The Red Army returned.
 So began a long period of rebuilding and reestablishing Communist rule.
 KMT agents, like Li Hsiu-tang (one of the landlords' sons who brought tea
 to the troops), were sent to prison and reeducated or, in extreme cases, exe-
 cuted. Land reform was finalized and labor exchange programs established.
 In the early 1950s, cooperative agriculture expanded, involving greater in-
 stitutionalization of Communist labor principles. Liu Ling formed a higher-
 order cooperative in the mid-1950s, called the East Shines Red Higher Agri-
 cultural Cooperative, which became the Liu Ling People's Commune during
 the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s.
 Event Populations, Components, and Bicomponents
 Our problem, as identified at the start, is to develop a method for casing
 interrelated event sequences. In order to make a case, we first need a popu-
 lation of events and information about their relation. The second step is to
 draw a boundary on the nodes in the graph. The problem (and solution) is
 known as the boundary-specification problem (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
 Drawing on an old tradition in the social network literature, we can isolate
 cases by defining a partition on the population of events. Standard clustering
 techniques are not appropriate for our problem, however, since arcs connect-
 ing dense regions of a graph (bridge nodes) might well play an important role
 in the narrative sequence we are trying to capture. Instead, we adopt a new
 strategy: identifying all bicomponents on the population. A component of
 a graph is a maximal connected subgraph. A maximal subgraph is one that
 cannot be made larger and still retain the properties that there is a path be-
 tween all pairs of nodes in the subgraph and that there is no path between
 a node in the component and a node not in the component. A bicomponent
 is a component where all nodes are connected by at least two different inde-
 pendent paths and where the addition of a node requires that it is connected
 to two nodes in the subgraph.
 The central idea is that a case, seen as a set of interconnected events pro-
 duced by multiple intercalated narratives, must have the property of at least
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 a bicomponent. A bicomponent is not necessarily a case; it is a candidate for a
 case. We define cases as bicomponents that are robust to discovery or future
 activation.
 Figure 5 reports all of the events mentioned in the 14 histories of the
 Chinese villagers we work with, intercalated to form a single graph. Almost
 2,000 unique events are mentioned, and each event is represented by a circle.
 Events that are in more than one narrative are shaded. Narrative time moves
 from the top to the bottom of the page. As in Figure 2, events are connected
 by arcs. In some regions of the graph, where events and their relations are
 especially dense, arcs are invisible. Events that are tied to one another by arcs
 in these dense regions appear to overlap in the graph. Events to the left side
 of the figure are embedded in event sequences that are not tied to events on
 the right side of the figure. There is no way to get from the left-side events
 to the right-side events. This is our population of events. Of course, there
 are millions of events not present. They might belong to some other history
 (for example, Marco Polo's travels), but not this history. But some of the
 events that are present look like they don't belong to this history (whatever
 it turns out to be) either; no pathway connects them to other events. Hap-
 penings without relations are just happenings. Their relations (if any) with
 other events not in our population may make them part of history, but not
 the history of the case we are working on.
 Figure 6 identifies and represents the major component. Note that we
 have moved from 1,995 events, many of which were not connected with any
 other events, to a smaller set of roughly 1,476 events, all of which were clus-
 tered together on the right-hand side of Figure 5. As in Figure 5, narrative
 time moves from the top to the bottom of the page, overlapping events are
 connected by invisible arcs, and events shared across multiple narratives are
 shaded. One could consider a component a case. The substantive problem is
 that it is too fragile. The deletion of any number of single arcs or nodes (causal
 relations or events) would result in a partition of the component into multiple
 discreet subgraphs. Our strategy is to define a candidate case more strictly,
 as a bicomponent, insisting that all events be connected by at least two in-
 dependent pathways, and to test its robustness to the future. The largest
 bicomponent contains 493 events. Figure 7 represents the structure of this
 bicomponent, following the template used in earlier figures. Figure 7 high-
 lights events shared across multiple narratives. This is the candidate case.
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 Figure 6 Largest component in Liu Ling
 Shared Event
 N = 1476
 Blocking the Future
 In order to know what an event means, one has to embed it in a sequence
 of interrelated events, which are in turn embedded in larger sequences that
 compose a case. Some cases are more robust than others. Robust cases are
 composed of elements which even if activated by the future (or by discovery)
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 Figure 7 Largest bicomponent, with shared events
 Shared Event
 N = 493 events
 don't change the case. In order to know what an event means, one has to
 know how dead it is or, alternatively, whether its activation breaks the case
 it is in, thereby drawing it into another case. Ultimately, only the real future
 can break or make cases, and even then one is always trapped by the uncer-
 tainty of the next day. But it is possible to assess case robustness by simulat-
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 ing the effect of the future. The by-products are both an assessment of case
 robustness and an inventory of events arrayed with respect to the probability
 that they will be case breakers. Figure 8 reports the robustness of our can-
 didate case, its resilience to both minor and major perturbation. The criteria
 we use is the Rand statistic, which reports the extent of classification agree-
 ment when a randomly selected pair of elements (in this instance, events) are
 classified in the same way (either belonging to the same cluster, or belonging
 to different clusters) across two partitions of a matrix. The adjusted statistic
 corrects for chance overlap (Morey and Agresti 1984: Eq. 9) and reports the
 agreement between two subgraphs beyond chance expectation.
 The left side of Figure 8 reports the extent of agreement between the
 initial events that compose the initial bicomponent (n = 479) and the events
 that compose a second bicomponent potentially altered by the random addi-
 tion of from 1 to 10 new edges to 1 or more of the 1,995 events that compose
 the event universe of Liu Ling. In other words, we add some number of ran-
 dom lines to connect previously disconnected events in Liu Ling. Adding
 edges changes the structure of the original graph (much like the discovery
 of a new "fact" might connect two events previously thought to be discon-
 nected). We then reduce the new graph to its largest bicomponent and com-
 pare the bicomponent from the original graph to the new bicomponent. For
 each case, we run the same simulation 500 times, assessing the effect of add-
 ing 1, 2, 3, . . . 10 edges. The dark horizontal line reports the median effect;
 the shaded crosshatch reports the interquartile range. Tailing away from the
 shaded areas are dots that report the extreme effects of adding edges.
 It should be immediately obvious that the case is robust to the impact
 of adding one edge. In the average instance, there is no change. In the worst-
 case scenario, adding a single line results in agreement between the two can-
 didate cases that is 93% greater than expected by chance. Butterfly effects (a
 subtle change in one area that concatenates through an interconnected sys-
 tem to transform the global structure) are possible but exceedingly rare. A
 similar pattern is observed for the addition of two or three new relations.
 Things break down a bit with more and more radical alterations of the origi-
 nal graph. By the time 10 new lines are added, the overlap between the two
 candidate cases falls to 90% greater than expected by chance. The scope of
 change is significant, much like the discovery of a new archive: multiple addi-
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 tions would lead to (re)connecting elements of the underlying data structure,
 thereby potentially changing their meaning by changing the case in which
 they are embedded. The simultaneous alteration of multiple causal relations
 can have a deep multiplier effect. Case instability results from specific com-
 binations (conjunctions) of multiple, simultaneous changes to the underlying
 data.
 The effect of deleting relationships (which is another way of thinking
 about deleting nodes) is much less pronounced. Even in extreme cases, delet-
 ing 10 edges and thus potentially up to 20 (or 1%) nodes, the two candidate
 cases remain remarkably similar. Here, the contrast between our case and
 traditional historical narratives (or even the component we identify earlier) is
 marked. These findings are not artifactual, and they provide insight into the
 structure of a case.
 If one were to delete an edge from a minimally connected bicomponent,
 the result would be a partition of the component into subgraphs and, hence,
 significantly lower classification agreement than we observe. The robustness
 of the case to deletion implies that the bicomponent is composed of mul-
 tiple dense clusters and that the events that compose each cluster are linked
 by more than two independent pathways. This structure is closer to that of
 social structure writ large. The local density of real event structures pro-
 tects cases from collapsing from perturbations that have the effect of deleting
 causal relationships between historical events.
 Case Breakers
 Cases may vary with respect to their robustness to the future. For cases that
 collapse under subtle pressure (by adding or deleting one or a few lines), one
 could have little confidence in the meanings ascribed to an event. With cases
 that are robust to the future, the meaning of the events that compose the case
 are fixed. It follows that if others followed the same research strategy, they
 would reveal the same case. Consequently, they would agree on the meaning
 of the event. This strikes us as a useful contribution.
 Just as useful is a by-product of case assessment: an inventory of events
 arrayed with respect to their probability of breaking the case. This array
 would allow historical social scientists to learn about the structural char-
 acteristics of events that have the potential (if activated) to touch off case-
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 breaking effects. From the tails in both panels of Figure 8, it is clear that in
 some instances, adding or subtracting one edge can break the case. These are
 pivotal events. Pivotal events may be induced in ways not already implied
 by the proximal cohesion of initial event clusters. One mechanism (differ-
 entiation) is that an early event cluster connects multiple subsequent event
 clusters, in each case through multiple independent paths. A second mecha-
 nism (convergence) is that separate early event clusters connect to the same
 subsequent event clusters, in each case through multiple independent paths.
 Various combinations of differentiation may also be visible. In the first case
 (differentiation), what looks like a unitary event cluster splits into multiple
 event clusters. In the second case (convergence), we observe the reverse kind
 of structure (e-mail to author, 8 February 1999).
 One simple strategy for identifying high-impact edges/nodes is to loop
 over each edge (or pair of nodes) one at a time, delete or add it, and calculate
 an adjusted Rand statistic for the resulting bicomponents. This generates a
 systematic potential impact score for each edge, under the assumption that
 it could be deleted (or added between nodes) by some future event. At the
 boundaries of our case lie smaller, relatively dense event clusters. For ex-
 ample, one cluster contains the history of the faux battle between the Com-
 munists and the KMT. Whether or not events that lie on the boundary of
 cases are pivotal depends on the structure of the smaller event clusters that,
 like moons, are suspended on the periphery of the focal case. In this instance,
 pivotal events are exclusively located within the semidense regions of the
 bicomponent.
 The Tidal Pool Revisited
 The method we propose is intended to assist, if not replace, judgment and
 to provide a mechanism for testing judgment-based cases. Our application of
 a traditional narrative strategy generated the "brief history of a tidal pool."
 We now explore the overlap between events in the tidal pool and the bi-
 component we propose as the real case. Figure 9 represents this overlap. As
 in Figure 7, the major bicomponent (n = 479 events) is shown. Shaded circles
 represent events in the tidal pool narrative. The bicomponent includes all
 tidal pool events but contains an additional set of 146 events. These events
 are evenly distributed across the whole structure. They provide the necessary
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 Figure 9 Tidal pool events within the largest bicomponent
 Tidal Pool Event
 N = 493 Events
 347 Tidal pool Events
 146 Other Events
 structural glue holding the bicomponent together. Removing them breaks
 the bicomponent into separate disjoint subgraphs. Our judgment method
 missed them--for example, the critical structural role that the temporary
 alliance between the Communists and KMT played in the future of the vil-
 lage. We may be bad historians, but if we are right about our method, the best
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 historians will arrive at the bicomponent. Weaker social science historians
 like us might do better to start there.
 Discussion
 Networks have contributed greatly to our substantive understanding of par-
 ticular historical contexts and events. This article, initially conceived of as a
 review of the ways that networks have been helpful for history, has veered
 off into a new direction: exploiting network methods for doing history. By
 focusing on networks as useful for the method of historical social science,
 new solutions to old problems have appeared. The deepest problem is what
 events mean. The central idea of this article is that the meaning of events is
 conditional on their position in a sequence of events and that, hence, the cen-
 tral problem for historical social science is casing event sequences in order to
 induce beginnings and ends. Old solutions to casing are all around. They rest
 on knowing the end, having a theory to guide the selection of events back
 toward some beginning. The structure of history appears as a sand clock.
 All of the tangible causal energy is locked into thin behavioral streams that
 appear subject to all sorts of contingency. It takes little vision to see that,
 like nested Russian dolls, the inside of one history provides the outside skein
 for another. At each remove, what appears globally sparse is revealed to be
 locally dense, and vice versa.
 Network methods provide a way to exploit this fractal characteristic of
 event structures, if we can reveal them. We illustrate a simple strategy for
 generating and revealing dense event structures as a new unit of analysis. The
 strategy we illustrate is the intercalation of multiple stories. More sophisti-
 cated, and ultimately more pliable, sampling strategies could be used as well.
 The historical event structures that our method produces are characterized
 by cyclicity, redundancy, and local density. Because they are structures (as
 opposed to lines), they have meaningful parameters. They conform to our
 intuitive understanding of a case as something that envelopes events within
 a boundary, by virtue either of similar structural principles organizing rela-
 tions between elements or of deep structuration through memory or cultural
 encoding. They also conform to our intuitive understanding of how history
 unfolds as the result of multiple sources operating through multiple path-
 ways at multiple levels of observation. Contingency, while possible, is re-
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 vealed to be constrained by event structures that absorb events of the present
 and the future.
 An enduring problem in social science history is how to do history and
 social science at the same time. History demands that we reveal the meaning
 of events. Social science demands that we abstract from context to yield pat-
 tern. This abstraction must remain meaningful, so sensitivity to context is
 critical. Networks have always provided substantive sensitivity. It is our sense
 that knowing sensitivity to context comes from knowing the right case. And
 here new network methods, applied to the practice of social science history,
 may have much to offer. An article on blocking the future would be remiss
 not to notice that there is much more to be done.
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 1 There are clearly parallel developments in studies of interaction sequences, where
 the meaning of an event - for example, an exchange sequence - is given only by the
 events subsequent to it (Bearman 1997). Eric Leifer (1988) provides a useful imagery
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 with respect to interaction sequences. While there may be long periods in which a
 role structure does not emerge between interacting individuals, once a role structure
 appears, the meaning of past (and future) events or exchanges is fixed. By analogy,
 we are interested in a method for identifying role structures in historical event se-
 quences.
 2 One popular idea is that historians are historians because they discover facts. This is
 mistaken. Imagine if historians had access to all the facts that ever were, just as they
 happened. Arthur Danto (1985) shows that even if such an ideal chronicle of events
 existed, the historians' craft (and problematic) would remain unchanged. In order
 to be historians, historians need to write narrative sentences. An ideal chronicle of
 events recorded when they happened just as they happened would not in any way
 help historians.
 3 A gift given after a gift received means something different than a gift given before
 a gift received. Danto (1985) notes, for example, that Kant "complained bitterly"
 about the realignment of the past history of philosophy, which created philosophical
 predecessors for his novel insights, thereby making them (and him) less novel. Many
 academics have this sense as well. Examples of this kind are inexhaustible.
 4 In the history of the Indian wars of the West, the Battle of Wounded Knee was but
 one of many small inconclusive skirmishes. If we could just imagine taking it out
 of the event sequences that compose the history of Indian wars, we would not miss
 much. However, one can easily recognize that the battle might have been impor-
 tant (or could well become important) as the consequence of some future event now
 unknown to us. Our interest, as developed further, is in providing a meaningful as-
 sessment of this probability.
 5 Most events are dead. Whatever proportion they make of the whole is not particu-
 larly important. However, it must be huge. Consider a simple narrative sentence
 proposed by Danto (1985): "On Christmas day 1642, Isaac Newton, the father of
 modern physics, was born." This sentence could only have been written after mod-
 ern physics was born. Billions of births, trips, accidents, deaths, and so on make up
 the event universe-- all of which might one day be activated by a narrative sentence.
 What possible sentences could we write in the future about all the births that day to
 mothers whose sons and daughters at that moment had the same chance of making
 history? What future events will give birth to these pasts? Most pasts will never have
 a second opportunity. As I write, I can imagine events of the past flying through a
 figurative event horizon and disappearing forever. The dreams of parents lost, but
 not to history.
 6 It is not hard to come up with an unrealistic potential case breaker for any "dead"
 case, of course. In this case, approaching the second millennium, imagine how our
 understanding of the process might be shaped by the Second Coming of Christ.
 7 Time does not provide complete protection. Imagine how our interpretation (in
 2300) of the Christianizing of the West would change should the Church of Latter-
This content downloaded from 209.2.208.15 on Fri, 22 Mar 2019 19:34:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 530 Social Science History
 Day Saints be able to sustain a growth rate of 40% per decade (Stark 1996) -which
 is perhaps as unlikely as the Second Coming.
 8 A good story is parsimonious, but parsimony in representation generates as a by-
 product a distorted view of the likely real density of historical events. The trick is to
 generate a population of events from multiple parsimonious accounts.
 9 Rational choice modelers would deny this by pointing to how their models embed
 context (such as values, goods, costs, etc.) into actors' decision frameworks. But the
 fact that all contexts are equally easy to embed into the model gives the ghost away.
 10 To stretch a weak metaphor, relational theorists have argued persuasively that the
 action is in the potholes, not the big highways of macrolevel historical forces. Be-
 cause actual action dynamics are seen to shape historical outcomes, each element of
 the observed event sequence, often seen as the outcome of unique conjunctions of
 events and relations, has a contingent flavor.
 11 We can only observe social structures that are robust. Nonrobust social structures
 don't last long enough to observe. A popular idiom explains what makes structures
 robust. Love, like a tree, can weather storms better if it bends. Consider, for example,
 caste systems. The robust macrostructure is the product of constant reordering of
 degrees of ritual purity fought out in different ways in thousands of different vil-
 lages, themselves strung together through subcaste kinship networks (Marriot 1968).
 Similar dynamics have been documented for corporate interlocks (Palmer 1984) and
 complex kinship systems (White et al. 1999; Bearman 1997).
 12 There are many more similarities. One similarity, which we exploit subsequently, is
 that the characteristics of global social networks can be meaningfully ascertained by
 sampling local networks, an argument that is often implicit in historical narratives.
 13 In observed social structures, the absence of independence means that subtle
 changes on one relation can have unanticipated effects on another relation. It is like-
 wise with history. Consider the dilemma, documented by David Lowenthal (1985),
 faced by time-travelers, who discover that their arrival in the past has changed the
 past and, thus, their future-leaving them trapped in the past, because they no
 longer exist in the future. However, such experiences seem extremely unlikely.
 14 An empirical illustration of the first strategy is developed in an article available on
 request from the senior author.
 15 Authors of life stories want their stories to be believable and to make sense. To make
 sense, a life story must have limits. Limits are provided by the end, by the events
 that are thinkable, and by motive, the rhetoric that allows events to be concatenated
 in time. Without an end, life stories cannot make sense (Burke 1945).
 16 One problematic feature of the stories is that Myrdal directed the interviews with
 an eye toward publication, thereby truncating redundant narrative and (presumably)
 editing out redundancy in the printed version. Consequently, our models of event
 structures developed from the overlap of narrative elements are likely sparser than
 they would otherwise be, suggesting that an "unedited" case would exhibit greater
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 local event density and robustness than we are able to show. Since the bias works to
 our disadvantage, and our interest is in illustrating the method, we ignore it. One
 interesting point is that our analysis of the case brings into relief the close set of con-
 nections between the revolutionary period and the introduction of communes. This
 point is unanticipated in Myrdal's work. Of the 20-plus stories and story fragments,
 we selected the longest stories for this illustration. A full enumeration of all events
 in all stories would by definition make the case we consider denser as well.
 17 All events can be chopped up into smaller and smaller fragments of both behavior
 and time--for example, a "smile" event can be reduced to a series of synapse fir-
 ings and muscle movements. Charles Tilly has suggested that by allowing for event
 heterogeneity, we simply push the judgment problem back into a problem of event
 coding. In our case, we consider this possibility unlikely, since simple rules can be
 used to define elements as events as they are linked by narrative clauses in sentences.
 While we did not formally test for intercoder reliability, agreement on events and
 arcs was extremely high.
 18 Fate as motive is chance operating in conjunction with a human agent. Fate as mo-
 tive appears mystical, for experience is perceived as mystical when a chance event
 becomes "representative of the individual," when a sequence of events follows ex-
 actly the pattern desired (Burke 1945).
 19 These positions may be schematic or temporal. For the latter, consider, for example,
 a history of the Battle of Wounded Knee written before 1973 versus a history of
 the Battle of Wounded Knee written after 1973. For the former, imagine a feminist
 history, a socialist history, a Whig history, and so on.
 20 The tidal pool narrative has 347 events in it. This reduction to 31 events follows
 the general strategy developed in Bearman and Stovel's article (forthcoming) for be-
 tweenness reduction: eliminating nodes and relations that stand between other nodes
 only in otherwise dense subclusters.
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